


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26 Feb 63

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C/D/LA Briefing Notes on Cuba

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We are especially anxious to receive the following types of new information:

- A. Indications that Cubans are being trained to take over sophisticated Soviet equipment; e.g. SAM, Cruise missiles, air defense warning system, etc.
 - 1. We are particularly interested in the timing--e.g. when (if ever) can the Cubans be expected to have full operational control of SAMs?
 - 2. If the Soviet troops from the ~~xxx~~ armored combat groups leave, will they turn over their equipment to the Cubans? FROGS?
- B. On the political side, we are especially interested in all indications of factionalism among Cuban leaders; e.g. pro-Chinese vs. pro-Soviet, old PSP vs Fidelistas, other.
 - 1. Changes in the relative standing of various political leaders might be revealed in the organization--or reorganization--of the top political organizations with the emergence of the PURS.
 - 2. We have reports, for instance, that old Communists Lazaro Pena, Juan Marinello, and others are to be purged.. Also that Emilio

C. The Castro regime continues to emphasize subversion in other LA countries. Speeches by leading officials since last fall have shown an increasing attention to this and some, like Blas Roca's speech on 23 January, have been specific in stating that Cuba will continue "to give our support, each day in greater proportions, to the Venezuelan people" in their struggle for "liberation from imperialism."

1. That this is more than just talk is suggested by the increasing amount of information on guerrilla training of LAs in Cuba that has come from returning trainees since late last year,
2. We estimate that at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 1,500 LAs received training in guerrilla warfare last year.
3. Broadcasts from Cuba to LA have also shown an increased aggressiveness.

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III. Cuban-Soviet Relations:

- A. While Castro appears almost certainly to have been angered by the Soviet missile and bomber withdrawals last fall, he clearly recognizes his dependence on Moscow.
1. While he will probably never forget the humiliation which the Soviets caused him--and will probably express his resentment from time to time--he is likely to try to avoid going beyond the point that would jeopardize his economic lifeline.
 - a. In a veiled reference in his 15 January speech, he castigated those "harebrained theoreticians" who/say the Cuban revolution has developed peacefully from capitalism to socialism. This sounds like a slap at Khrushchev.
 2. The Chinese Communists appear to be making every effort to take advantage of Castro's problems with the Soviets--as well as Castro's apparent emotional attachment to principles of direct revolutionary action which appear more akin to Chinese Communist than to Soviet positions at present.
 3. ~~The~~ ^A contrast ^{is} ~~was~~ apparent in the treatment in Moscow and Peiping to various pronouncements from Cuba. Peiping emphasized and Moscow ignored some of the more militant passages from recent Castro speeches.
 4. On 7 February--after 2 months of negotiations--the 1963 protocol to the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement was signed in Moscow. There was none of the usual laudatory comment in the Soviet press.
 5. Peiping made a big issue of the signing on 22 February of the equivalent protocol with Cuba, after only about two weeks of negotiations. The Peiping announcement also stated that a new

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and unclarified agreement was reached "on the Chinese loan to Cuba"--possibly a new arrangement for Cuba to defer payments on the 1960 Chinese Communist loan. Communist China also granted Cuba a long term, interest free loan on Cuba's trade deficit with China.

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